fs/proc/task_mmu.c: shift mm_access() from m_start() to proc_maps_open()
A simple test-case from Kirill Shutemov
cat /proc/self/maps >/dev/null
chmod +x /proc/self/net/packet
exec /proc/self/net/packet
makes lockdep unhappy, cat/exec take seq_file->lock + cred_guard_mutex in
the opposite order.
It's a false positive and probably we should not allow "chmod +x" on proc
files. Still I think that we should avoid mm_access() and cred_guard_mutex
in sys_read() paths, security checking should happen at open time. Besides,
this doesn't even look right if the task changes its ->mm between m_stop()
and m_start().
Add the new "mm_struct *mm" member into struct proc_maps_private and change
proc_maps_open() to initialize it using proc_mem_open(). Change m_start() to
use priv->mm if atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_users) succeeds or return NULL (eof)
otherwise.
The only complication is that proc_maps_open() users should additionally do
mmdrop() in fop->release(), add the new proc_map_release() helper for that.
Note: this is the user-visible change, if the task execs after open("maps")
the new ->mm won't be visible via this file. I hope this is fine, and this
matches /proc/pid/mem bahaviour.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Linus Torvalds
parent
5381e169e7
commit
29a40ace84
@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ extern int proc_remount(struct super_block *, int *, char *);
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struct proc_maps_private {
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struct proc_maps_private {
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struct pid *pid;
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struct pid *pid;
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struct task_struct *task;
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struct task_struct *task;
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struct mm_struct *mm;
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#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
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#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
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struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma;
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struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma;
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#endif
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#endif
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@ -165,9 +165,9 @@ static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
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if (!priv->task)
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if (!priv->task)
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return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
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return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
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mm = mm_access(priv->task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
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mm = priv->mm;
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if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm))
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if (!mm || !atomic_inc_not_zero(&mm->mm_users))
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return mm;
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return NULL;
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down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
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down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
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tail_vma = get_gate_vma(mm);
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tail_vma = get_gate_vma(mm);
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@ -240,9 +240,28 @@ static int proc_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
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return -ENOMEM;
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return -ENOMEM;
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priv->pid = proc_pid(inode);
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priv->pid = proc_pid(inode);
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priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
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if (IS_ERR(priv->mm)) {
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int err = PTR_ERR(priv->mm);
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seq_release_private(inode, file);
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return err;
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}
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return 0;
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return 0;
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}
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}
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static int proc_map_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
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{
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struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
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struct proc_maps_private *priv = seq->private;
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if (priv->mm)
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mmdrop(priv->mm);
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return seq_release_private(inode, file);
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}
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static int do_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
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static int do_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
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const struct seq_operations *ops)
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const struct seq_operations *ops)
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{
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{
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@ -398,14 +417,14 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_maps_operations = {
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.open = pid_maps_open,
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.open = pid_maps_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release_private,
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.release = proc_map_release,
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};
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};
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const struct file_operations proc_tid_maps_operations = {
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const struct file_operations proc_tid_maps_operations = {
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.open = tid_maps_open,
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.open = tid_maps_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release_private,
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.release = proc_map_release,
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};
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};
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/*
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/*
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@ -680,14 +699,14 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_smaps_operations = {
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.open = pid_smaps_open,
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.open = pid_smaps_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release_private,
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.release = proc_map_release,
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};
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};
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const struct file_operations proc_tid_smaps_operations = {
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const struct file_operations proc_tid_smaps_operations = {
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.open = tid_smaps_open,
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.open = tid_smaps_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release_private,
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.release = proc_map_release,
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};
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};
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/*
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/*
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@ -1544,13 +1563,13 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_numa_maps_operations = {
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.open = pid_numa_maps_open,
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.open = pid_numa_maps_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release_private,
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.release = proc_map_release,
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};
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};
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const struct file_operations proc_tid_numa_maps_operations = {
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const struct file_operations proc_tid_numa_maps_operations = {
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.open = tid_numa_maps_open,
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.open = tid_numa_maps_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release_private,
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.release = proc_map_release,
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};
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};
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#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA */
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#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA */
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