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LF-292-1 crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization

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RNG (re-)initialization will be needed on pm resume path,
thus refactor the corresponding code out of the probe callback.

Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Ciocoi Radulescu <valentin.ciocoi@nxp.com>
This commit is contained in:
Horia Geantă
2020-02-21 13:41:01 +02:00
parent 5b06a496a2
commit d8ec539192
1 changed files with 102 additions and 87 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

189
drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
View File

@ -328,13 +328,12 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
/*
* kick_trng - sets the various parameters for enabling the initialization
* of the RNG4 block in CAAM
* @pdev - pointer to the platform device
* @dev - pointer to the controller device
* @ent_delay - Defines the length (in system clocks) of each entropy sample.
*/
static void kick_trng(struct platform_device *pdev, int ent_delay)
static void kick_trng(struct device *dev, int ent_delay)
{
struct device *ctrldev = &pdev->dev;
struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(ctrldev);
struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl;
struct rng4tst __iomem *r4tst;
u32 val;
@ -570,10 +569,105 @@ static void caam_dma_dev_unregister(void *data)
platform_device_unregister(data);
}
static int caam_ctrl_rng_init(struct device *dev)
{
struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl = ctrlpriv->ctrl;
int ret, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
u8 rng_vid;
if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
perfmon = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
(struct caam_perfmon *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->perfmon :
(struct caam_perfmon *)&ctrl->perfmon;
rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
} else {
struct version_regs __iomem *vreg;
vreg = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
(struct version_regs *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
(struct version_regs *)&ctrl->vreg;
rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
}
/*
* If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
* already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
* In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
*/
if (!ctrlpriv->mc_en && rng_vid >= 4) {
ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
/*
* If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
* generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
* the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
* to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
*/
gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_IFMASK;
do {
int inst_handles =
rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
RDSTA_IFMASK;
/*
* If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
* (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
* parameters are properly set and thus the function
* setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
* Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
* the TRNG parameters.
*/
if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
dev_info(dev,
"Entropy delay = %u\n",
ent_delay);
kick_trng(dev, ent_delay);
ent_delay += 400;
}
/*
* if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
* and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
* upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
* interval, leading to a sucessful initialization of
* the RNG.
*/
ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
gen_sk);
if (ret == -EAGAIN)
/*
* if here, the loop will rerun,
* so don't hog the CPU
*/
cpu_relax();
} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay < RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
return ret;
}
/*
* Set handles init'ed by this module as the complement of the
* already initialized ones
*/
ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_IFMASK;
/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
}
return 0;
}
/* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
int ret, ring, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
int ret, ring;
u64 caam_id;
const struct soc_device_attribute *imx_soc_match;
static struct platform_device_info caam_dma_pdev_info = {
@ -591,7 +685,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
struct dentry *dfs_root;
#endif
u32 scfgr, comp_params;
u8 rng_vid;
int pg_size;
int BLOCK_OFFSET = 0;
bool reg_access = true;
@ -875,90 +968,12 @@ set_dma_mask:
return ret;
}
if (!reg_access)
goto report_live;
if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
} else {
struct version_regs __iomem *vreg;
vreg = ring ? (struct version_regs *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
(struct version_regs *)&ctrl->vreg;
rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
}
/*
* If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
* already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
* In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
*/
if (!ctrlpriv->mc_en && rng_vid >= 4) {
ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
/*
* If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
* generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
* the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
* to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
*/
gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_IFMASK;
do {
int inst_handles =
rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
RDSTA_IFMASK;
/*
* If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
* (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
* parameters are properly set and thus the function
* setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
* Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
* the TRNG parameters.
*/
if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
dev_info(dev,
"Entropy delay = %u\n",
ent_delay);
kick_trng(pdev, ent_delay);
ent_delay += 400;
}
/*
* if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
* and the kick_trng(...) function will modfiy the
* upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
* interval, leading to a sucessful initialization of
* the RNG.
*/
ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
gen_sk);
if (ret == -EAGAIN)
/*
* if here, the loop will rerun,
* so don't hog the CPU
*/
cpu_relax();
} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay < RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
if (reg_access) {
ret = caam_ctrl_rng_init(dev);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Set handles init'ed by this module as the complement of the
* already initialized ones
*/
ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_IFMASK;
/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
}
/* NOTE: RTIC detection ought to go here, around Si time */
report_live:
caam_id = (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ms) << 32 |
(u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ls);