Compare commits

...

13 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
41b67d8f30 Linux 3.15.1 2014-06-16 13:44:27 -07:00
a6543e2968 ahci: add PCI ID for Marvell 88SE91A0 SATA Controller
commit 754a292fe6 upstream.

Add support for Marvell Technology Group Ltd. 88SE91A0 SATA 6Gb/s
Controller by adding its PCI ID.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Schrägle <ajs124.ajs124@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-16 13:44:10 -07:00
72591c3023 ahci: Add Device ID for HighPoint RocketRaid 642L
commit d251836508 upstream.

This device normally comes with a proprietary driver, using a web GUI
to configure RAID:
 http://www.highpoint-tech.com/USA_new/series_rr600-download.htm
But thankfully it also works out of the box with the AHCI driver,
being just a Marvell 88SE9235.

Devices 640L, 644L, 644LS should also be supported but not tested here.

Signed-off-by: Jérôme Carretero <cJ-ko@zougloub.eu>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-16 13:44:09 -07:00
6dcfd1f5d4 rtl28xxu: add [1b80:d3af] Sveon STV27
commit 74a86272f0 upstream.

Added support for Sveon STV27 device (rtl2832u + FC0013 tuner)

Signed-off-by: Alessandro Miceli <angelofsky1980@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-16 13:44:09 -07:00
8bc4154c9a rtl28xxu: add [1b80:d39d] Sveon STV20
commit f27f5b0ee4 upstream.

Added Sveon STV20 device based on Realtek RTL2832U and FC0012 tuner

Signed-off-by: Alessandro Miceli <angelofsky1980@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-16 13:44:09 -07:00
b1947d698f rtl28xxu: add 1b80:d395 Peak DVB-T USB
commit 9ca24ae408 upstream.

Add USB ID for Peak DVB-T USB.

[crope@iki.fi: fix Brian email address and indentation]
Signed-off-by: Brian Healy <healybrian@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
2014-06-16 13:44:09 -07:00
0cb62c9a24 mei: me: read H_CSR after asserting reset
commit c40765d919 upstream.

According the spec the host should read H_CSR again
after asserting reset H_RST to ensure that reset was
read by the firmware

Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-16 13:44:09 -07:00
4f104ed166 mei: me: drop harmful wait optimization
commit 07cd7be3d9 upstream.

It my take time till ME_RDY will be cleared after the reset,
so we cannot check the bit before we got the interrupt

Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-16 13:44:09 -07:00
b1b94ac553 mei: me: fix hw ready reset flow
commit b04ada92ff upstream.

We cleared H_RST for H_CSR on spurious interrupt generated when ME_RDY
while cleared and not while  ME_RDY is set. The spurious interrupt
is not delivered on all platforms in this case the
driver may fail to initialize.

Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-16 13:44:09 -07:00
f15e38fc0f PCI/MSI: Fix memory leak in free_msi_irqs()
commit b701c0b1fe upstream.

free_msi_irqs() is leaking memory, since list_for_each_entry(entry,
&dev->msi_list, list) {...} is never executed, because dev->msi_list is
made empty by the loop just above this one.

Fix it by relying on zero termination of attribute array like
populate_msi_sysfs() does.

Fixes: 1c51b50c29 ("PCI/MSI: Export MSI mode using attributes, not kobjects")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-16 13:44:09 -07:00
e015cef702 auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
commit a3c5493119 upstream.

Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.

This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.

eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
audit rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-16 13:44:09 -07:00
4e358517b2 lock_parent: don't step on stale ->d_parent of all-but-freed one
commit c2338f2dc7 upstream.

Dentry that had been through (or into) __dentry_kill() might be seen
by shrink_dentry_list(); that's normal, it'll be taken off the shrink
list and freed if __dentry_kill() has already finished.  The problem
is, its ->d_parent might be pointing to already freed dentry, so
lock_parent() needs to be careful.

We need to check that dentry hasn't already gone into __dentry_kill()
*and* grab rcu_read_lock() before dropping ->d_lock - the latter makes
sure that whatever we see in ->d_parent after dropping ->d_lock it
won't be freed until we drop rcu_read_lock().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-16 13:44:09 -07:00
d3c8656bc2 fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
commit 23adbe12ef upstream.

The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces.  For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.

This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.

Fixes CVE-2014-4014.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-06-16 13:44:09 -07:00
14 changed files with 81 additions and 44 deletions

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
VERSION = 3
PATCHLEVEL = 15
SUBLEVEL = 0
SUBLEVEL = 1
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Shuffling Zombie Juror

View File

@ -445,10 +445,14 @@ static const struct pci_device_id ahci_pci_tbl[] = {
.driver_data = board_ahci_yes_fbs }, /* 88se9172 */
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MARVELL_EXT, 0x9192),
.driver_data = board_ahci_yes_fbs }, /* 88se9172 on some Gigabyte */
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MARVELL_EXT, 0x91a0),
.driver_data = board_ahci_yes_fbs },
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MARVELL_EXT, 0x91a3),
.driver_data = board_ahci_yes_fbs },
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MARVELL_EXT, 0x9230),
.driver_data = board_ahci_yes_fbs },
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_TTI, 0x0642),
.driver_data = board_ahci_yes_fbs },
/* Promise */
{ PCI_VDEVICE(PROMISE, 0x3f20), board_ahci }, /* PDC42819 */

View File

@ -361,6 +361,7 @@
#define USB_PID_FRIIO_WHITE 0x0001
#define USB_PID_TVWAY_PLUS 0x0002
#define USB_PID_SVEON_STV20 0xe39d
#define USB_PID_SVEON_STV20_RTL2832U 0xd39d
#define USB_PID_SVEON_STV22 0xe401
#define USB_PID_SVEON_STV22_IT9137 0xe411
#define USB_PID_AZUREWAVE_AZ6027 0x3275
@ -375,4 +376,5 @@
#define USB_PID_CTVDIGDUAL_V2 0xe410
#define USB_PID_PCTV_2002E 0x025c
#define USB_PID_PCTV_2002E_SE 0x025d
#define USB_PID_SVEON_STV27 0xd3af
#endif

View File

@ -1537,6 +1537,12 @@ static const struct usb_device_id rtl28xxu_id_table[] = {
&rtl2832u_props, "Crypto ReDi PC 50 A", NULL) },
{ DVB_USB_DEVICE(USB_VID_KYE, 0x707f,
&rtl2832u_props, "Genius TVGo DVB-T03", NULL) },
{ DVB_USB_DEVICE(USB_VID_KWORLD_2, 0xd395,
&rtl2832u_props, "Peak DVB-T USB", NULL) },
{ DVB_USB_DEVICE(USB_VID_KWORLD_2, USB_PID_SVEON_STV20_RTL2832U,
&rtl2832u_props, "Sveon STV20", NULL) },
{ DVB_USB_DEVICE(USB_VID_KWORLD_2, USB_PID_SVEON_STV27,
&rtl2832u_props, "Sveon STV27", NULL) },
/* RTL2832P devices: */
{ DVB_USB_DEVICE(USB_VID_HANFTEK, 0x0131,

View File

@ -164,6 +164,9 @@ static void mei_me_hw_reset_release(struct mei_device *dev)
hcsr |= H_IG;
hcsr &= ~H_RST;
mei_hcsr_set(hw, hcsr);
/* complete this write before we set host ready on another CPU */
mmiowb();
}
/**
* mei_me_hw_reset - resets fw via mei csr register.
@ -183,8 +186,21 @@ static int mei_me_hw_reset(struct mei_device *dev, bool intr_enable)
else
hcsr &= ~H_IE;
dev->recvd_hw_ready = false;
mei_me_reg_write(hw, H_CSR, hcsr);
/*
* Host reads the H_CSR once to ensure that the
* posted write to H_CSR completes.
*/
hcsr = mei_hcsr_read(hw);
if ((hcsr & H_RST) == 0)
dev_warn(&dev->pdev->dev, "H_RST is not set = 0x%08X", hcsr);
if ((hcsr & H_RDY) == H_RDY)
dev_warn(&dev->pdev->dev, "H_RDY is not cleared 0x%08X", hcsr);
if (intr_enable == false)
mei_me_hw_reset_release(dev);
@ -201,6 +217,7 @@ static int mei_me_hw_reset(struct mei_device *dev, bool intr_enable)
static void mei_me_host_set_ready(struct mei_device *dev)
{
struct mei_me_hw *hw = to_me_hw(dev);
hw->host_hw_state = mei_hcsr_read(hw);
hw->host_hw_state |= H_IE | H_IG | H_RDY;
mei_hcsr_set(hw, hw->host_hw_state);
}
@ -233,10 +250,7 @@ static bool mei_me_hw_is_ready(struct mei_device *dev)
static int mei_me_hw_ready_wait(struct mei_device *dev)
{
int err;
if (mei_me_hw_is_ready(dev))
return 0;
dev->recvd_hw_ready = false;
mutex_unlock(&dev->device_lock);
err = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(dev->wait_hw_ready,
dev->recvd_hw_ready,
@ -491,14 +505,13 @@ irqreturn_t mei_me_irq_thread_handler(int irq, void *dev_id)
/* check if we need to start the dev */
if (!mei_host_is_ready(dev)) {
if (mei_hw_is_ready(dev)) {
mei_me_hw_reset_release(dev);
dev_dbg(&dev->pdev->dev, "we need to start the dev.\n");
dev->recvd_hw_ready = true;
wake_up_interruptible(&dev->wait_hw_ready);
} else {
dev_dbg(&dev->pdev->dev, "Reset Completed.\n");
mei_me_hw_reset_release(dev);
dev_dbg(&dev->pdev->dev, "Spurious Interrupt\n");
}
goto end;
}

View File

@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static void free_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev *dev)
if (dev->msi_irq_groups) {
sysfs_remove_groups(&dev->dev.kobj, dev->msi_irq_groups);
msi_attrs = dev->msi_irq_groups[0]->attrs;
list_for_each_entry(entry, &dev->msi_list, list) {
while (msi_attrs[count]) {
dev_attr = container_of(msi_attrs[count],
struct device_attribute, attr);
kfree(dev_attr->attr.name);

View File

@ -50,14 +50,14 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
(!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
!uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
!inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
(!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
(!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
!inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
return -EPERM;
/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
/* Also check the setgid bit! */
if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
inode->i_gid) &&
!inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
}
@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, const struct iattr *attr)
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
!inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}

View File

@ -532,10 +532,12 @@ static inline struct dentry *lock_parent(struct dentry *dentry)
struct dentry *parent = dentry->d_parent;
if (IS_ROOT(dentry))
return NULL;
if (unlikely((int)dentry->d_lockref.count < 0))
return NULL;
if (likely(spin_trylock(&parent->d_lock)))
return parent;
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
again:
parent = ACCESS_ONCE(dentry->d_parent);
spin_lock(&parent->d_lock);

View File

@ -1839,14 +1839,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner);
* inode_owner_or_capable - check current task permissions to inode
* @inode: inode being checked
*
* Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER to the inode, or
* owns the file.
* Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the
* inode owner uid mapped, or owns the file.
*/
bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
{
struct user_namespace *ns;
if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
return true;
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER))
ns = current_user_ns();
if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid))
return true;
return false;
}

View File

@ -332,10 +332,11 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
/* DACs are overridable for directories */
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
@ -345,7 +346,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
* at least one exec bit set.
*/
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
/*
@ -353,7 +354,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
*/
mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
if (mask == MAY_READ)
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
@ -2379,7 +2380,7 @@ static inline int check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
return 0;
if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid))
return 0;
return !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
}
/*

View File

@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr(
* cleared upon successful return from chown()
*/
if ((ip->i_d.di_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) &&
!inode_capable(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
ip->i_d.di_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
/*

View File

@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool capable(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */

View File

@ -728,6 +728,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
{
int word, bit;
if (val > 0xffffffff)
return false;
word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
return false;
bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
return rule->mask[word] & bit;
}
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
@ -745,11 +761,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
rcu_read_lock();
if (!list_empty(list)) {
int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
&state, false)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
@ -769,20 +782,16 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_names *n,
struct audit_context *ctx) {
int word, bit;
int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
struct audit_entry *e;
enum audit_state state;
word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
if (list_empty(list))
return 0;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
ctx->current_state = state;
return 1;

View File

@ -424,23 +424,19 @@ bool capable(int cap)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
/**
* inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode
* capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped
* @inode: The inode in question
* @cap: The capability in question
*
* Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
* targeted at it's own user namespace and that the given inode is owned
* by the current user namespace or a child namespace.
*
* Currently we check to see if an inode is owned by the current
* user namespace by seeing if the inode's owner maps into the
* current user namespace.
*
* Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at
* its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are
* mapped into the current user namespace.
*/
bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid);
return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_capable);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);