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16 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
d0c077266e Linux 4.17.1 2018-06-11 22:43:19 +02:00
2d3cc89eb0 PCI: hv: Do not wait forever on a device that has disappeared
commit c3635da2a3 upstream.

Before the guest finishes the device initialization, the device can be
removed anytime by the host, and after that the host won't respond to
the guest's request, so the guest should be prepared to handle this
case.

Add a polling mechanism to detect device presence.

Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
[lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com: edited commit log]
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:19 +02:00
53d26741c9 ipmr: fix error path when ipmr_new_table fails
[ Upstream commit e783bb00ad ]

commit 0bbbf0e7d0 ("ipmr, ip6mr: Unite creation of new mr_table")
refactored ipmr_new_table, so that it now returns NULL when
mr_table_alloc fails. Unfortunately, all callers of ipmr_new_table
expect an ERR_PTR.

This can result in NULL deref, for example when ipmr_rules_exit calls
ipmr_free_table with NULL net->ipv4.mrt in the
!CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES version.

This patch makes mr_table_alloc return errors, and changes
ip6mr_new_table and its callers to return/expect error pointers as
well. It also removes the version of mr_table_alloc defined under
!CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_COMMON, since it is never used.

Fixes: 0bbbf0e7d0 ("ipmr, ip6mr: Unite creation of new mr_table")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:19 +02:00
ce324bbc88 net: dsa: b53: Fix for brcm tag issue in Cygnus SoC
[ Upstream commit 5040cc990c ]

In the Broadcom Cygnus SoC, the brcm tag needs to be inserted
in between the mac address and the ether type (should use
'DSA_PROTO_TAG_BRCM') for the packets sent to the internal
b53 switch.

Since the Cygnus was added with the BCM58XX device id and the
BCM58XX uses 'DSA_PROTO_TAG_BRCM_PREPEND', the data path is
broken, due to the incorrect brcm tag location.

Add a new b53 device id (BCM583XX) for Cygnus family to fix the
issue. Add the new device id to the BCM58XX family as Cygnus
is similar to the BCM58XX in most other functionalities.

Fixes: 1160603960 ("net: dsa: b53: Support prepended Broadcom tags")

Signed-off-by: Arun Parameswaran <arun.parameswaran@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Reported-by: Clément Péron <peron.clem@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Clément Péron <peron.clem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:19 +02:00
2f2a68a67c vrf: check the original netdevice for generating redirect
[ Upstream commit 2f17becfbe ]

Use the right device to determine if redirect should be sent especially
when using vrf. Same as well as when sending the redirect.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:18 +02:00
2b14bcf74b team: use netdev_features_t instead of u32
[ Upstream commit 25ea66544b ]

This code was introduced in 2011 around the same time that we made
netdev_features_t a u64 type.  These days a u32 is not big enough to
hold all the potential features.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:18 +02:00
f9c8107b98 sctp: not allow transport timeout value less than HZ/5 for hb_timer
[ Upstream commit 1d88ba1ebb ]

syzbot reported a rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU which is caused
by too small value set on rto_min with SCTP_RTOINFO sockopt. With this
value, hb_timer will get stuck there, as in its timer handler it starts
this timer again with this value, then goes to the timer handler again.

This problem is there since very beginning, and thanks to Eric for the
reproducer shared from a syzbot mail.

This patch fixes it by not allowing sctp_transport_timeout to return a
smaller value than HZ/5 for hb_timer, which is based on TCP's min rto.

Note that it doesn't fix this issue by limiting rto_min, as some users
are still using small rto and no proper value was found for it yet.

Reported-by: syzbot+3dcd59a1f907245f891f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:18 +02:00
bbfa6b2ecc rtnetlink: validate attributes in do_setlink()
[ Upstream commit 644c7eebbf ]

It seems that rtnl_group_changelink() can call do_setlink
while a prior call to validate_linkmsg(dev = NULL, ...) could
not validate IFLA_ADDRESS / IFLA_BROADCAST

Make sure do_setlink() calls validate_linkmsg() instead
of letting its callers having this responsibility.

With help from Dmitry Vyukov, thanks a lot !

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in is_valid_ether_addr include/linux/etherdevice.h:199 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in eth_prepare_mac_addr_change net/ethernet/eth.c:275 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in eth_mac_addr+0x203/0x2b0 net/ethernet/eth.c:308
CPU: 1 PID: 8695 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #103
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x149/0x260 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1084
 __msan_warning_32+0x6e/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:686
 is_valid_ether_addr include/linux/etherdevice.h:199 [inline]
 eth_prepare_mac_addr_change net/ethernet/eth.c:275 [inline]
 eth_mac_addr+0x203/0x2b0 net/ethernet/eth.c:308
 dev_set_mac_address+0x261/0x530 net/core/dev.c:7157
 do_setlink+0xbc3/0x5fc0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2317
 rtnl_group_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:2824 [inline]
 rtnl_newlink+0x1fe9/0x37a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2976
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa32/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4646
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4664
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x1678/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
 netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x455a09
RSP: 002b:00007fc07480ec68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc07480f6d4 RCX: 0000000000455a09
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200003c0 RDI: 0000000000000014
RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 00000000000005d0 R14: 00000000006fdc20 R15: 0000000000000000

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
 kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:294 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12b/0x210 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:685
 kmsan_memcpy_origins+0x11d/0x170 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:527
 __msan_memcpy+0x109/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:478
 do_setlink+0xb84/0x5fc0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2315
 rtnl_group_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:2824 [inline]
 rtnl_newlink+0x1fe9/0x37a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2976
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa32/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4646
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4664
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x1678/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
 netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Uninit was created at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:189
 kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:315
 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2753 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb32/0x11b0 mm/slub.c:4395
 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x2cb/0x9e0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:988 [inline]
 netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline]
 netlink_sendmsg+0x76e/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1876
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: e7ed828f10 ("netlink: support setting devgroup parameters")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:18 +02:00
97c37ac70d net/packet: refine check for priv area size
[ Upstream commit eb73190f4f ]

syzbot was able to trick af_packet again [1]

Various commits tried to address the problem in the past,
but failed to take into account V3 header size.

[1]

tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from 72 to 4294967224. macoff=96
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prb_run_all_ft_ops net/packet/af_packet.c:1016 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prb_fill_curr_block.isra.59+0x4e5/0x5c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1039
Write of size 2 at addr ffff8801cb62000e by task kworker/1:2/2106

CPU: 1 PID: 2106 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc7+ #77
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
 __asan_report_store2_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:436
 prb_run_all_ft_ops net/packet/af_packet.c:1016 [inline]
 prb_fill_curr_block.isra.59+0x4e5/0x5c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1039
 __packet_lookup_frame_in_block net/packet/af_packet.c:1094 [inline]
 packet_current_rx_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:1117 [inline]
 tpacket_rcv+0x1866/0x3340 net/packet/af_packet.c:2282
 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x891/0xb90 net/core/dev.c:2018
 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3049 [inline]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x16b/0xc10 net/core/dev.c:3069
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2724/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3584
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3617
 neigh_resolve_output+0x679/0xad0 net/core/neighbour.c:1358
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:482 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0xc9c/0x2810 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:120
 ip6_finish_output+0x5fe/0xbc0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:154
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:277 [inline]
 ip6_output+0x227/0x9b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:171
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
 ndisc_send_skb+0x100d/0x1570 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:491
 ndisc_send_ns+0x3c1/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:633
 addrconf_dad_work+0xbef/0x1340 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4033
 process_one_work+0xc1e/0x1b50 kernel/workqueue.c:2145
 worker_thread+0x1cc/0x1440 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
 kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412

The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00072d8800 count:0 mapcount:-127 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff8801cb620e80
flags: 0x2fffc0000000000()
raw: 02fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8801cb620e80 00000000ffffff80
raw: ffffea00072e3820 ffffea0007132d20 0000000000000002 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8801cb61ff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff8801cb61ff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff8801cb620000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                      ^
 ffff8801cb620080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff8801cb620100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff

Fixes: 2b6867c2ce ("net/packet: fix overflow in check for priv area size")
Fixes: dc808110bb ("packet: handle too big packets for PACKET_V3")
Fixes: f6fb8f100b ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:18 +02:00
8b1cd48bae net: metrics: add proper netlink validation
[ Upstream commit 5b5e7a0de2 ]

Before using nla_get_u32(), better make sure the attribute
is of the proper size.

Code recently was changed, but bug has been there from beginning
of git.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rtnetlink_put_metrics+0x553/0x960 net/core/rtnetlink.c:746
CPU: 1 PID: 14139 Comm: syz-executor6 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #103
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x149/0x260 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1084
 __msan_warning_32+0x6e/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:686
 rtnetlink_put_metrics+0x553/0x960 net/core/rtnetlink.c:746
 fib_dump_info+0xc42/0x2190 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1361
 rtmsg_fib+0x65f/0x8c0 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:419
 fib_table_insert+0x2314/0x2b50 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1287
 inet_rtm_newroute+0x210/0x340 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:779
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa32/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4646
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4664
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x1678/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
 netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x455a09
RSP: 002b:00007faae5fd8c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007faae5fd96d4 RCX: 0000000000455a09
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000013
RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 00000000000005d0 R14: 00000000006fdc20 R15: 0000000000000000

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
 kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:294 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12b/0x210 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:685
 __msan_chain_origin+0x69/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:529
 fib_convert_metrics net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1056 [inline]
 fib_create_info+0x2d46/0x9dc0 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1150
 fib_table_insert+0x3e4/0x2b50 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1146
 inet_rtm_newroute+0x210/0x340 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:779
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa32/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4646
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4664
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x1678/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
 netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Uninit was created at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:189
 kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:315
 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2753 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb32/0x11b0 mm/slub.c:4395
 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x2cb/0x9e0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:988 [inline]
 netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline]
 netlink_sendmsg+0x76e/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1876
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: a919525ad8 ("net: Move fib_convert_metrics to metrics file")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:18 +02:00
b9fbfc02f5 netdev-FAQ: clarify DaveM's position for stable backports
[ Upstream commit 75d4e704fa ]

Per discussion with David at netconf 2018, let's clarify
DaveM's position of handling stable backports in netdev-FAQ.

This is important for people relying on upstream -stable
releases.

Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:18 +02:00
ac87a90a0d l2tp: fix refcount leakage on PPPoL2TP sockets
[ Upstream commit 3d609342cc ]

Commit d02ba2a611 ("l2tp: fix race in pppol2tp_release with session
object destroy") tried to fix a race condition where a PPPoL2TP socket
would disappear while the L2TP session was still using it. However, it
missed the root issue which is that an L2TP session may accept to be
reconnected if its associated socket has entered the release process.

The tentative fix makes the session hold the socket it is connected to.
That saves the kernel from crashing, but introduces refcount leakage,
preventing the socket from completing the release process. Once stalled,
everything the socket depends on can't be released anymore, including
the L2TP session and the l2tp_ppp module.

The root issue is that, when releasing a connected PPPoL2TP socket, the
session's ->sk pointer (RCU-protected) is reset to NULL and we have to
wait for a grace period before destroying the socket. The socket drops
the session in its ->sk_destruct callback function, so the session
will exist until the last reference on the socket is dropped.
Therefore, there is a time frame where pppol2tp_connect() may accept
reconnecting a session, as it only checks ->sk to figure out if the
session is connected. This time frame is shortened by the fact that
pppol2tp_release() calls l2tp_session_delete(), making the session
unreachable before resetting ->sk. However, pppol2tp_connect() may
grab the session before it gets unhashed by l2tp_session_delete(), but
it may test ->sk after the later got reset. The race is not so hard to
trigger and syzbot found a pretty reliable reproducer:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=418578d2a4389074524e04d641eacb091961b2cf

Before d02ba2a611, another race could let pppol2tp_release()
overwrite the ->__sk pointer of an L2TP session, thus tricking
pppol2tp_put_sk() into calling sock_put() on a socket that is different
than the one for which pppol2tp_release() was originally called. To get
there, we had to trigger the race described above, therefore having one
PPPoL2TP socket being released, while the session it is connected to is
reconnecting to a different PPPoL2TP socket. When releasing this new
socket fast enough, pppol2tp_release() overwrites the session's
->__sk pointer with the address of the new socket, before the first
pppol2tp_put_sk() call gets scheduled. Then the pppol2tp_put_sk() call
invoked by the original socket will sock_put() the new socket,
potentially dropping its last reference. When the second
pppol2tp_put_sk() finally runs, its socket has already been freed.

With d02ba2a611, the session takes a reference on both sockets.
Furthermore, the session's ->sk pointer is reset in the
pppol2tp_session_close() callback function rather than in
pppol2tp_release(). Therefore, ->__sk can't be overwritten and
pppol2tp_put_sk() is called only once (l2tp_session_delete() will only
run pppol2tp_session_close() once, to protect the session against
concurrent deletion requests). Now pppol2tp_put_sk() will properly
sock_put() the original socket, but the new socket will remain, as
l2tp_session_delete() prevented the release process from completing.
Here, we don't depend on the ->__sk race to trigger the bug. Getting
into the pppol2tp_connect() race is enough to leak the reference, no
matter when new socket is released.

So it all boils down to pppol2tp_connect() failing to realise that the
session has already been connected. This patch drops the unneeded extra
reference counting (mostly reverting d02ba2a611) and checks that
neither ->sk nor ->__sk is set before allowing a session to be
connected.

Fixes: d02ba2a611 ("l2tp: fix race in pppol2tp_release with session object destroy")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:18 +02:00
317594ac46 ipv6: omit traffic class when calculating flow hash
[ Upstream commit fa1be7e01e ]

Some of the code paths calculating flow hash for IPv6 use flowlabel member
of struct flowi6 which, despite its name, encodes both flow label and
traffic class. If traffic class changes within a TCP connection (as e.g.
ssh does), ECMP route can switch between path. It's also inconsistent with
other code paths where ip6_flowlabel() (returning only flow label) is used
to feed the key.

Use only flow label everywhere, including one place where hash key is set
using ip6_flowinfo().

Fixes: 51ebd31815 ("ipv6: add support of equal cost multipath (ECMP)")
Fixes: f70ea018da ("net: Add functions to get skb->hash based on flow structures")
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:18 +02:00
e61dbe7992 ip6mr: only set ip6mr_table from setsockopt when ip6mr_new_table succeeds
[ Upstream commit 848235edb5 ]

Currently, raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table is set unconditionally during
ip6_mroute_setsockopt(MRT6_TABLE). A subsequent attempt at the same
setsockopt will fail with -ENOENT, since we haven't actually created
that table.

A similar fix for ipv4 was included in commit 5e1859fbcc ("ipv4: ipmr:
various fixes and cleanups").

Fixes: d1db275dd3 ("ipv6: ip6mr: support multiple tables")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:18 +02:00
dc60fb7336 bnx2x: use the right constant
[ Upstream commit dd612f18a4 ]

Nearby code that also tests port suggests that the P0 constant should be
used when port is zero.

The semantic match that finds this problem is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)

// <smpl>
@@
expression e,e1;
@@

* e ? e1 : e1
// </smpl>

Fixes: 6c3218c6f7 ("bnx2x: Adjust ETS to 578xx")
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:17 +02:00
209dedf806 netfilter: nf_flow_table: attach dst to skbs
commit 2a79fd3908 upstream.

Some drivers, such as vxlan and wireguard, use the skb's dst in order to
determine things like PMTU. They therefore loose functionality when flow
offloading is enabled. So, we ensure the skb has it before xmit'ing it
in the offloading path.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-11 22:43:17 +02:00
23 changed files with 131 additions and 68 deletions

View File

@ -179,6 +179,15 @@ A: No. See above answer. In short, if you think it really belongs in
dash marker line as described in Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst to
temporarily embed that information into the patch that you send.
Q: Are all networking bug fixes backported to all stable releases?
A: Due to capacity, Dave could only take care of the backports for the last
2 stable releases. For earlier stable releases, each stable branch maintainer
is supposed to take care of them. If you find any patch is missing from an
earlier stable branch, please notify stable@vger.kernel.org with either a
commit ID or a formal patch backported, and CC Dave and other relevant
networking developers.
Q: Someone said that the comment style and coding convention is different
for the networking content. Is this true?

View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 17
SUBLEVEL = 0
SUBLEVEL = 1
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Merciless Moray

View File

@ -684,7 +684,8 @@ static int b53_switch_reset(struct b53_device *dev)
* still use this driver as a library and need to perform the reset
* earlier.
*/
if (dev->chip_id == BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID) {
if (dev->chip_id == BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID ||
dev->chip_id == BCM583XX_DEVICE_ID) {
b53_read8(dev, B53_CTRL_PAGE, B53_SOFTRESET, &reg);
reg |= SW_RST | EN_SW_RST | EN_CH_RST;
b53_write8(dev, B53_CTRL_PAGE, B53_SOFTRESET, reg);
@ -1879,6 +1880,18 @@ static const struct b53_chip_data b53_switch_chips[] = {
.jumbo_pm_reg = B53_JUMBO_PORT_MASK,
.jumbo_size_reg = B53_JUMBO_MAX_SIZE,
},
{
.chip_id = BCM583XX_DEVICE_ID,
.dev_name = "BCM583xx/11360",
.vlans = 4096,
.enabled_ports = 0x103,
.arl_entries = 4,
.cpu_port = B53_CPU_PORT,
.vta_regs = B53_VTA_REGS,
.duplex_reg = B53_DUPLEX_STAT_GE,
.jumbo_pm_reg = B53_JUMBO_PORT_MASK,
.jumbo_size_reg = B53_JUMBO_MAX_SIZE,
},
{
.chip_id = BCM7445_DEVICE_ID,
.dev_name = "BCM7445",

View File

@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ enum {
BCM53018_DEVICE_ID = 0x53018,
BCM53019_DEVICE_ID = 0x53019,
BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID = 0x5800,
BCM583XX_DEVICE_ID = 0x58300,
BCM7445_DEVICE_ID = 0x7445,
BCM7278_DEVICE_ID = 0x7278,
};
@ -181,6 +182,7 @@ static inline int is5301x(struct b53_device *dev)
static inline int is58xx(struct b53_device *dev)
{
return dev->chip_id == BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID ||
dev->chip_id == BCM583XX_DEVICE_ID ||
dev->chip_id == BCM7445_DEVICE_ID ||
dev->chip_id == BCM7278_DEVICE_ID;
}

View File

@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id b53_srab_of_match[] = {
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm53018-srab" },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm53019-srab" },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm5301x-srab" },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm11360-srab", .data = (void *)BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm11360-srab", .data = (void *)BCM583XX_DEVICE_ID },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm58522-srab", .data = (void *)BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm58525-srab", .data = (void *)BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm58535-srab", .data = (void *)BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID },
@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id b53_srab_of_match[] = {
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm58623-srab", .data = (void *)BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm58625-srab", .data = (void *)BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID },
{ .compatible = "brcm,bcm88312-srab", .data = (void *)BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID },
{ .compatible = "brcm,cygnus-srab", .data = (void *)BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID },
{ .compatible = "brcm,cygnus-srab", .data = (void *)BCM583XX_DEVICE_ID },
{ .compatible = "brcm,nsp-srab", .data = (void *)BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID },
{ /* sentinel */ },
};

View File

@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ static void bnx2x_ets_e3b0_nig_disabled(const struct link_params *params,
* slots for the highest priority.
*/
REG_WR(bp, (port) ? NIG_REG_P1_TX_ARB_NUM_STRICT_ARB_SLOTS :
NIG_REG_P1_TX_ARB_NUM_STRICT_ARB_SLOTS, 0x100);
NIG_REG_P0_TX_ARB_NUM_STRICT_ARB_SLOTS, 0x100);
/* Mapping between the CREDIT_WEIGHT registers and actual client
* numbers
*/

View File

@ -1004,7 +1004,8 @@ static void team_port_disable(struct team *team,
static void __team_compute_features(struct team *team)
{
struct team_port *port;
u32 vlan_features = TEAM_VLAN_FEATURES & NETIF_F_ALL_FOR_ALL;
netdev_features_t vlan_features = TEAM_VLAN_FEATURES &
NETIF_F_ALL_FOR_ALL;
netdev_features_t enc_features = TEAM_ENC_FEATURES;
unsigned short max_hard_header_len = ETH_HLEN;
unsigned int dst_release_flag = IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE |

View File

@ -556,6 +556,26 @@ static void put_pcichild(struct hv_pci_dev *hv_pcidev,
static void get_hvpcibus(struct hv_pcibus_device *hv_pcibus);
static void put_hvpcibus(struct hv_pcibus_device *hv_pcibus);
/*
* There is no good way to get notified from vmbus_onoffer_rescind(),
* so let's use polling here, since this is not a hot path.
*/
static int wait_for_response(struct hv_device *hdev,
struct completion *comp)
{
while (true) {
if (hdev->channel->rescind) {
dev_warn_once(&hdev->device, "The device is gone.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
if (wait_for_completion_timeout(comp, HZ / 10))
break;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* devfn_to_wslot() - Convert from Linux PCI slot to Windows
* @devfn: The Linux representation of PCI slot
@ -1568,7 +1588,8 @@ static struct hv_pci_dev *new_pcichild_device(struct hv_pcibus_device *hbus,
if (ret)
goto error;
wait_for_completion(&comp_pkt.host_event);
if (wait_for_response(hbus->hdev, &comp_pkt.host_event))
goto error;
hpdev->desc = *desc;
refcount_set(&hpdev->refs, 1);
@ -2069,15 +2090,16 @@ static int hv_pci_protocol_negotiation(struct hv_device *hdev)
sizeof(struct pci_version_request),
(unsigned long)pkt, VM_PKT_DATA_INBAND,
VMBUS_DATA_PACKET_FLAG_COMPLETION_REQUESTED);
if (!ret)
ret = wait_for_response(hdev, &comp_pkt.host_event);
if (ret) {
dev_err(&hdev->device,
"PCI Pass-through VSP failed sending version reqquest: %#x",
"PCI Pass-through VSP failed to request version: %d",
ret);
goto exit;
}
wait_for_completion(&comp_pkt.host_event);
if (comp_pkt.completion_status >= 0) {
pci_protocol_version = pci_protocol_versions[i];
dev_info(&hdev->device,
@ -2286,11 +2308,12 @@ static int hv_pci_enter_d0(struct hv_device *hdev)
ret = vmbus_sendpacket(hdev->channel, d0_entry, sizeof(*d0_entry),
(unsigned long)pkt, VM_PKT_DATA_INBAND,
VMBUS_DATA_PACKET_FLAG_COMPLETION_REQUESTED);
if (!ret)
ret = wait_for_response(hdev, &comp_pkt.host_event);
if (ret)
goto exit;
wait_for_completion(&comp_pkt.host_event);
if (comp_pkt.completion_status < 0) {
dev_err(&hdev->device,
"PCI Pass-through VSP failed D0 Entry with status %x\n",
@ -2330,11 +2353,10 @@ static int hv_pci_query_relations(struct hv_device *hdev)
ret = vmbus_sendpacket(hdev->channel, &message, sizeof(message),
0, VM_PKT_DATA_INBAND, 0);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!ret)
ret = wait_for_response(hdev, &comp);
wait_for_completion(&comp);
return 0;
return ret;
}
/**
@ -2404,11 +2426,11 @@ static int hv_send_resources_allocated(struct hv_device *hdev)
size_res, (unsigned long)pkt,
VM_PKT_DATA_INBAND,
VMBUS_DATA_PACKET_FLAG_COMPLETION_REQUESTED);
if (!ret)
ret = wait_for_response(hdev, &comp_pkt.host_event);
if (ret)
break;
wait_for_completion(&comp_pkt.host_event);
if (comp_pkt.completion_status < 0) {
ret = -EPROTO;
dev_err(&hdev->device,

View File

@ -307,16 +307,6 @@ static inline void vif_device_init(struct vif_device *v,
{
}
static inline void *
mr_table_alloc(struct net *net, u32 id,
struct mr_table_ops *ops,
void (*expire_func)(struct timer_list *t),
void (*table_set)(struct mr_table *mrt,
struct net *net))
{
return NULL;
}
static inline void *mr_mfc_find_parent(struct mr_table *mrt,
void *hasharg, int parent)
{

View File

@ -906,6 +906,11 @@ static inline __be32 ip6_make_flowinfo(unsigned int tclass, __be32 flowlabel)
return htonl(tclass << IPV6_TCLASS_SHIFT) | flowlabel;
}
static inline __be32 flowi6_get_flowlabel(const struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
return fl6->flowlabel & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
}
/*
* Prototypes exported by ipv6
*/

View File

@ -1334,7 +1334,7 @@ __u32 __get_hash_from_flowi6(const struct flowi6 *fl6, struct flow_keys *keys)
keys->ports.src = fl6->fl6_sport;
keys->ports.dst = fl6->fl6_dport;
keys->keyid.keyid = fl6->fl6_gre_key;
keys->tags.flow_label = (__force u32)fl6->flowlabel;
keys->tags.flow_label = (__force u32)flowi6_get_flowlabel(fl6);
keys->basic.ip_proto = fl6->flowi6_proto;
return flow_hash_from_keys(keys);

View File

@ -2256,6 +2256,10 @@ static int do_setlink(const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
int err;
err = validate_linkmsg(dev, tb);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tb[IFLA_NET_NS_PID] || tb[IFLA_NET_NS_FD] || tb[IFLA_IF_NETNSID]) {
struct net *net = rtnl_link_get_net_capable(skb, dev_net(dev),
tb, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
@ -2619,10 +2623,6 @@ static int rtnl_setlink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
goto errout;
}
err = validate_linkmsg(dev, tb);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
err = do_setlink(skb, dev, ifm, extack, tb, ifname, 0);
errout:
return err;

View File

@ -717,6 +717,8 @@ bool fib_metrics_match(struct fib_config *cfg, struct fib_info *fi)
nla_strlcpy(tmp, nla, sizeof(tmp));
val = tcp_ca_get_key_by_name(fi->fib_net, tmp, &ecn_ca);
} else {
if (nla_len(nla) != sizeof(u32))
return false;
val = nla_get_u32(nla);
}
@ -1043,6 +1045,8 @@ fib_convert_metrics(struct fib_info *fi, const struct fib_config *cfg)
if (val == TCP_CA_UNSPEC)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
if (nla_len(nla) != sizeof(u32))
return -EINVAL;
val = nla_get_u32(nla);
}
if (type == RTAX_ADVMSS && val > 65535 - 40)

View File

@ -35,17 +35,19 @@ mr_table_alloc(struct net *net, u32 id,
struct net *net))
{
struct mr_table *mrt;
int err;
mrt = kzalloc(sizeof(*mrt), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mrt)
return NULL;
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
mrt->id = id;
write_pnet(&mrt->net, net);
mrt->ops = *ops;
if (rhltable_init(&mrt->mfc_hash, mrt->ops.rht_params)) {
err = rhltable_init(&mrt->mfc_hash, mrt->ops.rht_params);
if (err) {
kfree(mrt);
return NULL;
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mrt->mfc_cache_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mrt->mfc_unres_queue);

View File

@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ nf_flow_offload_ip_hook(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
enum flow_offload_tuple_dir dir;
struct flow_offload *flow;
struct net_device *outdev;
const struct rtable *rt;
struct rtable *rt;
struct iphdr *iph;
__be32 nexthop;
@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ nf_flow_offload_ip_hook(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
dir = tuplehash->tuple.dir;
flow = container_of(tuplehash, struct flow_offload, tuplehash[dir]);
rt = (const struct rtable *)flow->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst_cache;
rt = (struct rtable *)flow->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst_cache;
if (unlikely(nf_flow_exceeds_mtu(skb, rt)))
return NF_ACCEPT;
@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ nf_flow_offload_ip_hook(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
skb->dev = outdev;
nexthop = rt_nexthop(rt, flow->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src_v4.s_addr);
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rt->dst);
neigh_xmit(NEIGH_ARP_TABLE, outdev, &nexthop, skb);
return NF_STOLEN;

View File

@ -507,7 +507,8 @@ int ip6_forward(struct sk_buff *skb)
send redirects to source routed frames.
We don't send redirects to frames decapsulated from IPsec.
*/
if (skb->dev == dst->dev && opt->srcrt == 0 && !skb_sec_path(skb)) {
if (IP6CB(skb)->iif == dst->dev->ifindex &&
opt->srcrt == 0 && !skb_sec_path(skb)) {
struct in6_addr *target = NULL;
struct inet_peer *peer;
struct rt6_info *rt;

View File

@ -227,8 +227,8 @@ static int __net_init ip6mr_rules_init(struct net *net)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&net->ipv6.mr6_tables);
mrt = ip6mr_new_table(net, RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
if (!mrt) {
err = -ENOMEM;
if (IS_ERR(mrt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(mrt);
goto err1;
}
@ -301,8 +301,13 @@ static int ip6mr_fib_lookup(struct net *net, struct flowi6 *flp6,
static int __net_init ip6mr_rules_init(struct net *net)
{
net->ipv6.mrt6 = ip6mr_new_table(net, RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
return net->ipv6.mrt6 ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
struct mr_table *mrt;
mrt = ip6mr_new_table(net, RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
if (IS_ERR(mrt))
return PTR_ERR(mrt);
net->ipv6.mrt6 = mrt;
return 0;
}
static void __net_exit ip6mr_rules_exit(struct net *net)
@ -1757,9 +1762,11 @@ int ip6_mroute_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval, uns
rtnl_lock();
ret = 0;
if (!ip6mr_new_table(net, v))
ret = -ENOMEM;
raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table = v;
mrt = ip6mr_new_table(net, v);
if (IS_ERR(mrt))
ret = PTR_ERR(mrt);
else
raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table = v;
rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
}

View File

@ -1576,6 +1576,12 @@ void ndisc_send_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct in6_addr *target)
ops_data_buf[NDISC_OPS_REDIRECT_DATA_SPACE], *ops_data = NULL;
bool ret;
if (netif_is_l3_master(skb->dev)) {
dev = __dev_get_by_index(dev_net(skb->dev), IPCB(skb)->iif);
if (!dev)
return;
}
if (ipv6_get_lladdr(dev, &saddr_buf, IFA_F_TENTATIVE)) {
ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "Redirect: no link-local address on %s\n",
dev->name);

View File

@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ nf_flow_offload_ipv6_hook(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
skb->dev = outdev;
nexthop = rt6_nexthop(rt, &flow->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src_v6);
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rt->dst);
neigh_xmit(NEIGH_ND_TABLE, outdev, nexthop, skb);
return NF_STOLEN;

View File

@ -1868,7 +1868,7 @@ out:
} else {
keys->addrs.v6addrs.src = key_iph->saddr;
keys->addrs.v6addrs.dst = key_iph->daddr;
keys->tags.flow_label = ip6_flowinfo(key_iph);
keys->tags.flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(key_iph);
keys->basic.ip_proto = key_iph->nexthdr;
}
}
@ -1889,7 +1889,7 @@ u32 rt6_multipath_hash(const struct net *net, const struct flowi6 *fl6,
} else {
hash_keys.addrs.v6addrs.src = fl6->saddr;
hash_keys.addrs.v6addrs.dst = fl6->daddr;
hash_keys.tags.flow_label = (__force u32)fl6->flowlabel;
hash_keys.tags.flow_label = (__force u32)flowi6_get_flowlabel(fl6);
hash_keys.basic.ip_proto = fl6->flowi6_proto;
}
break;

View File

@ -428,16 +428,6 @@ static void pppol2tp_put_sk(struct rcu_head *head)
*/
static void pppol2tp_session_close(struct l2tp_session *session)
{
struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
ps->__sk = rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock));
RCU_INIT_POINTER(ps->sk, NULL);
if (ps->__sk)
call_rcu(&ps->rcu, pppol2tp_put_sk);
mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
}
/* Really kill the session socket. (Called from sock_put() if
@ -480,15 +470,24 @@ static int pppol2tp_release(struct socket *sock)
sock_orphan(sk);
sock->sk = NULL;
/* If the socket is associated with a session,
* l2tp_session_delete will call pppol2tp_session_close which
* will drop the session's ref on the socket.
*/
session = pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sk);
if (session) {
struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
l2tp_session_delete(session);
/* drop the ref obtained by pppol2tp_sock_to_session */
sock_put(sk);
ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
ps->__sk = rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock));
RCU_INIT_POINTER(ps->sk, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
call_rcu(&ps->rcu, pppol2tp_put_sk);
/* Rely on the sock_put() call at the end of the function for
* dropping the reference held by pppol2tp_sock_to_session().
* The last reference will be dropped by pppol2tp_put_sk().
*/
}
release_sock(sk);
@ -742,7 +741,8 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
*/
mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
if (rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock))) {
lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock)) ||
ps->__sk) {
mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
error = -EEXIST;
goto end;
@ -803,7 +803,6 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
out_no_ppp:
/* This is how we get the session context from the socket. */
sock_hold(sk);
sk->sk_user_data = session;
rcu_assign_pointer(ps->sk, sk);
mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);

View File

@ -4282,7 +4282,7 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
goto out;
if (po->tp_version >= TPACKET_V3 &&
req->tp_block_size <=
BLK_PLUS_PRIV((u64)req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv))
BLK_PLUS_PRIV((u64)req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv) + sizeof(struct tpacket3_hdr))
goto out;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size < po->tp_hdrlen +
po->tp_reserve))

View File

@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ unsigned long sctp_transport_timeout(struct sctp_transport *trans)
trans->state != SCTP_PF)
timeout += trans->hbinterval;
return timeout;
return max_t(unsigned long, timeout, HZ / 5);
}
/* Reset transport variables to their initial values */